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WAGE lNEQUALITY AND SEGREGATION
BY SKILL
ABST RACT
Evidence from the United States, Britain, and France suggests that recent growth in wage
inequality has been accompanied by greater segregation of high- and low-skill workers into separate
firms. A model in which workers of different skill-levels are imperfect substitutes can
simultaneously account for these increases in segregation and inequality either through technological












One of the most disturbing economic trends of the last fifteen to twenty years has
been a growing wage gap between high- and low-skill workers in several industrialized
economies, including that of the United States. This trend has been well documented. Katz
and Murphy [1992], for example, find that, between 1979 and 1987, wages of men with a
high school education and 1-5 years of experience fell by twenty percent, while those of male
college graduates rose by ten percent.
This paper provides evidence that this increase in inequality has been accompanied by
growing segregation of workers by skill. That is, over time, it has become less common for
high- and low-skill workers to work in the same firm. Economic activity has shifted from
firms such as General Motors, which use both high- and low-skill workers, to firms such as
Microsoft and McDonald’s, whose workforces are much more homogeneous. For example, in
France, between 1986 and 1992, the correlation of log wages among workers in the same
establishment rose from 0.36 to 0.44, the correlation of experience rose from 0.11 to 0.16,
and the correlation of seniority grew from 0.24 to 0.31. In the United States, the correlation
between the wages of manufacturing production workers in the same plant rose from 0.76 in
1975 to 0.80 in 1986, and the correlation of a dummy variable for being a production worker
rose from 0.195 in 1976 to 0.228 in 1987,
We propose a simple model that can account for the simultaneous increases in
inequality and in segregation, as well as for the absolute decline in wages of low-skill
workers. In the model, workers of different skill-levels are imperfect substitutes, and outputis more sensitive to skill in some tasks than in others. What happens
as the evidence bears out (see below), the dispersion and mean of the




increase? We show that a rise in skill-dispersion causes firms that once hired both high- and
low-skill workers to specialize in one level or the other, thereby fostering segregation
(Proposition 3). Although, in this model, an increase in mean skill-level can enhance the
wages of the poor -- thus formalizing the so-called “trickle-down” principle (Proposition 1) --
we demonstrate that this principle relies crucially on a “tight” distribution of skills. Once the
skill-distribution becomes sufficiently dispersed -- as it is now likely to be in the United
States -- a further increase in mean skill-level raises the wages of high-skilled workers but
causes those of poorly-skilled workers to decline, thereby aggravating inequality (Proposition
2).
Note that this last implication contrasts with a widespread view of the labor market
articulated by Schmitt [1992]: “Rising returns to skills in the face of large increases in the
supply of skilled labor suggest a substantial shift in labor demand in favor of skilled
workers. ” Whereas labor economists such as Schmitt see rising mean-skill levels as
deepening the mystery of increasing inequality, our analysis suggests this rise in mean-skill
may have helped cause the increase in inequality.
The model’s implication that increases in skill-dispersion promote segregation of
workers by skill is consistent not only with the time-series data cited above, but also with
evidence that, among U.S. states, those with wider dispersion in educational attainment are
more segregated by education in employment. Casual empiricism suggests that developing
countries, with wide dispersion of skill, are particularly prone to dualism.3
We noted above that there is evidence that both the mean and the dispersion of the
skill-distribution have increased in the economies studied in this paper. It has been argued
(see Kahn and Lim [1994]) that skill-biased technological change may have raised the
effective skill-level of high-skill workers, which would have had the posited effects on the
distribution of skills. Of course, such technological change is difficult to measure, However,
there is also documentation of increases in the mean and dispersion of observable skills levels
(see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce [1993]). These shifts have been fairly modest, but our model
shows how they could have been magnified into significant changes in the income distribution
and degree of segregation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I offers a sketch of our
model and the theoretical results. Section II presents evidence that the United States, Britain,
and France have become more segregated in recent years. Section 111develops our theoretical
propositions in detail. Section IV provides evidence that U.S. states with greater skill
dispersion are more segregated by skill, as the model predicts. Section V interprets recent
increases in inequality and segregation in light of the model. The conclusion discusses policy
implications and speculates on the possibility that segregation may spur inequality by
reducing opportunities for low-skill workers to learn from higher-skill co-workers, giving rise
to a vicious cycle of increasing inequality and segregation.
I. A Sketch of the Theory
A model consistent with the stylized facts about segregation and inequality discussedabove must incorporate three ingredients. Specifically, it should be the case that
(i) workers of different skills are imperfect substitutes for one another;
(ii) different tasks within a firm are complementary;
and
(iii) different tasks within a firm are differentially sensitive to skill.
To see why (i), imperfect substitutability, is needed, let us examine a model in which
perfect substitutability obtains. Specifically, consider workers of two skill-levels q’ and q =
2q’. Then, in every firm, a worker of skill q can be replaced by two of skill q’, with no
other operational change. Clearly, q-workers will be paid exactly twice as much as q’-
workers regardless of the distribution of skills in the economy. Moreover, such a model
makes no prediction about what skill-levels we will see in a firm: there could as easily be one
worker of skill q as two of skill q’, To make any headway in explaining either inequality or
segregation, therefore, imperfect substitutability of skill is required.
In fact, there is a body of work within the labor economics literature that assumes
such imperfect substitutability (see Sattinger [1993] for a review). There is also empirical
evidence to justify the assumption; see Katz and Murphy [1992] and Murphy and Welch
[1992].
To understand the role of assumption (ii), complementarily, consider a firm in which
there are two tasks -- a “g” task and an “h” task -- but no complementarily between them.
Specifically, take a production function in which, if a q-worker is hired for the g-task and aq’-worker for the h-task, output is
(1) f(~,9’) =g(q)+~(q’).
Different skills are imperfect substitutes in this formulation: only one worker can be hired for
each task, and so the sort of two-for-one substitution contemplated above is ruled out. This
means that relative wages may depend on the distribution of skills; if, for example, the
number of q-workers rises relative to that of q’-workers, the former workers’ wages are
likely to experience a relative decline. Thus, unlike the first model, this formulation may say
something about inequality. However, it still implies nothing about the skill-composition of
firms. In particular, because tasks are not complementary, the optimal choice of skill for the
g-task is independent of that for the h-task.
Finally, to understand the need for (iii), differential skill-sensitivity, consider a
production function in which different tasks are complementary but identical in their
sensitivity to skill:
(2) f(934’) = 49’.
This is the production function used by Becker [1981] in his analysis of assortative marriage,
and also by Kremer [1993] in his study of labor markets and development. It has the
implication that there is always comDlete segregation of skill within firms: q-workers are
matched only with other q-workers, etc. To see this, imagine that there are two q-workers
and two q’-workers. Then either the q-workers can be matched with each other and the same
for the q’-workers (self-matching) or else there can be two matches consisting of one q- and
one q’-workers each (cross-matching). But self-matching leads to total output of q2+q’26
which is greater than the output of 2qq’ resulting from cross-matching. Hence, regardless of
the distribution of skills, production function (2) implies that we should see only self-
matching, and so the evolution from General Motors to Microsoft/McDonald’s discussed
above could not have taken place. We shall therefore introduce an asymmetry between tasks
by working with a production function of the form,
(4) f(939’)=qcq’d,
where t)<c<~. By redefining the unit of skill, we can rewrite this as
(3) ~( 93q’) = 94”, e>l.
For ease of computation (although none of the qualitative results depend on this), we shall, in
fact, take e=2, so that
(5) flq,q’) = 4q’2.
We can think of the q ‘-task (which is relatively sensitive to skill) as the “managerial” task
and the q-task (which is relatively skill-insensitive) as the “assistant’s” role. Hence, let us
rewrite the production function as
(6) fi9as~m) =9aq:.
Production function (6) has the implication that if a firm employs workers of skills L and H
(L< H), it is more efficient for the H-worker to be the manager (since LH2 > HL2). This
production function is closely related to one used by Rosen [1981, 1982], Miller [1983], and
Lucas [1978]:(7)
where qmis the skill of the manager, qi is the skill of subordinate i, and r, the number of
subordinates, is a choice variable. Under production function (7), there is no substitutability
of skill at the managerial level, but several low-skill subordinates can be substituted for one
high-skill subordinate. Hence, in equilibrium, low-skill workers become subordinates, and
high-skill workers become managers. The higher a manager’s skill, the more employees he
supervises.
By contrast, our production function (6) imposes imperfect substitutability on
subordinates as well as on managers. (In this sense, it combines the approaches inherent in (2)
and (7).) This has the implication that, in equilibrium, a manager of one firm may be of the
same or lower skill than a subordinate in another firm (even though, as already noted,
managers are more highly skilled than subordinates within the same firm). For example, an
M.B.A. might choose either to accept an entry-level position with high-skill colleagues at an
investment bank, or a more senior position at a less prestigious firm.
We consider a one-good economy in which there is an exogenous distribution of
workers of different skill. We take this distribution as given because, although ultimately it
too is endogenous, it is likely to change more slowly than the wage and matching patterns of
interest to us. We suppose that there is an indefinite supply of potential firms, all of which
have the production function (6). Hence, this is a competitive economy with constant returns
to scale.Our theoretical results
equilibrium wage distribution
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(Propositions 1-3 in Section III) examine how the competitive
and the pattern of skill-levels within firms are affected by shifts
in the distribution of skills. Here
Proposition 3 shows that,
we give a simplified account of these results.
as the dispersion of skills increases in the economy, the
relative dispersion of skill within firms falls. To get a feel for this, suppose that there are just
two skill-levels, L and H, where L < H. Now, given two workers of skill L and two workers
of skill H, it is more efficient for the workers to cross-match (L-workers match with H-
workers) rather than self-match (workers of the same skill-level match) if and only if
(8) L3 +H3 K 2LH2.
Thus because competitive equilibrium is efficient, we will have equilibrium cross-matching if
and only if (8) is satisfied, i.e.,
(9)
&
Imagine that the economy begins with a skill-distribution in which L and H are fairly
close in value. From (9), we will have cross-matching in equilibrium, i.e., each firm --
following the G.M. pattern -- will employ both low- and high-skill workers. (This cannot be
literally true if there are different numbers of L- and H-workers in the economy. If, say,
there are more H’s than L’s, all the L’s will be matched with Hs, and the remaining Hs will
be self-matched.)
Suppose now that the dispersion of skills increases. This can be modeled by supposing
that H increases and L decreases, Eventually (9) will no longer hold, at which point the
economy will re-align so that there is @ self-matching. That is, each firm will have onlyH-workers (Microsoft) or only L-workers (McDonald’s).
To understand this result less formally, note that there are two forces at work in
determining the equilibrium matching pattern. On the one hand, the asymmetry of the tasks
in the production function militates in favor of cross-matching between workers of different
skills, in which the more highly skilled worker is assigned the managerial task. On the other
hand, the complementarily between tasks promotes self- (i.e., assortative) matching. Now,
when tasks are perfectly symmetric, only the second effect is present, and we have perfect
assortative matching. For any given degree of asymmetry between tasks, however, there will
be some deviation from self-matching. That is, unequally skilled workers will be cross-
hatched up to the point in which the difference in their skills is so great that the second
effect overwhelms the first. At that point, as in the above two-point example, the economy
switches to self-matching. Proposition 3 generalizes this logic to the case of many skill-
levels.
Let us turn to the issue of wages. Proposition 1 demonstrates that if the distribution
of skills has sufficiently low dispersion, then an increase in the mean skill-level reduces
inequality in the sense that the wages of low-skill workers rise, whereas those of high-skill
workers decline. Proposition 2 establishes that the opposite is true if the distribution of skills
is sufficiently highly dispersed. That is, with a diffuse skill-distribution, an increase in the
mean skill-level aggravates wage inequality.
To see why these propositions hold in a simple case, consider an economy with three
skill-levels, L < M < H, and let us suppose that H and L satisfy (9). For easy computation,
assume that there are equal numbers (say, x each) of L- and H-workers and that the number10
of M-workers is at least 2x. Because H and L satisfy (9), we know that it is inefficient for L-
and H-workers to be self-matched. In fact, we claim that both L- and H-workers should be
matched with M-workers. The alternative would be for the L- and H-workers to be matched
with each other. But notice that, since L c M and M < H,
(lo) LH2 + M3 c U2 + MH2.
Condition (10) implies that total output would be raised by taking an L- and an H-worker
who are matched with each other and rematching both with M-workers (who were previously
self-matched). Now, because there is perfect competition and constant returns to scale, firms
make zero profit in equilibrium. Hence workers must absorb all revenue. Since there are




Thus, the zero profit requirement implies that the equilibrium L-wage is
(12) M3




w(H) = MHZ - —.
2
To model the idea of an increase in the mean skill-level, let us examine a small
increase in M. The derivatives of w(L) and w(H) with respect to M are, respectively,
(14) 2LM - ;M2
and
(15)12
The assumption of “low” dispersion of skill -- the assumption treated by Proposition 1
-- corresponds in this three-skill model to the condition that H = L. In this case, (14) is
positive, whereas (15) is negative. But this means that w(L) rises and w(~ falls as M
increases, which is what Proposition 1 asserts.
By contrast, it is readily shown that if
(16)
which corresponds to the higher dispersion of Proposition 2, then (14) is negative and (15) is
positive. Hence w(L) falls while w(~ rises when M increases, as required by Proposition 2,
To understand Proposition 1 at a more intuitive level, notice that when L = M the
share of the revenue going to the M-worker in an L-M match (i.e., M3/2 ) rises with M more
slowly than does the total product M2. Hence an increase in M confers a positive benefit on
L: the net marginal revenue left over after the M-worker is paid for his higher product is
positive. This can be viewed as a manifestation of the “trickle-down” principle, the theory
that propounds that some of the fruits generated by improving the productivity of middle- and
upper-class workers will accrue to the poor.
In our model, however, the trickle-down principle pertains only to skill-distributions
with low dispersion. If L and M are far enough apart, a further increase in M causes the
benefits from cross-matching between L and M to deteriorate relative to those from self-
matching. Therefore since w(M rises, w(L) must fall. At the same time, this increase in M
enhances the quality of a match between M and H (provided M and H were far enough apart13
to begin with), raising w(~. Hence, an increase in mean skill-level causes the wage gap
between H- and L- workers to increase, as Proposition 2 establishes.
Notice that our model has the feature that workers of median skill (M-workers in the
above example) can serve in equilibrium as either managers or assistants, depending on whom
they are matched with. This is a property that generalizes to the case of many skill-levels
(see Section III). We will speculate on its political and social implications in the conclusion.
II. Rising Segregation by Skill
We offer evidence that segregation of workers by skill has increased in the United
States, Britain, and France. Subsection 11.A defines the index we use to measure segregation,
and Subsection 11.B shows that the index has increased in these three countries when skill is
measured by any of three proxies: wages, worker classification, and experience.
11.A. The Segregation Index
Sociologists have used an index of correlation to measure segregation by dichotomous
variables, such as race [Bell, 1954; Robinson, 1950]. In this section, we propose an index of
segregation that generalizes this measure of correlation so that it can be applied to variables
taking on many values. We also adjust it to take account of the concentration of high-skill
workers that would have been expected purely from chance. (Ellison and Glaeser [1994]
develop an index of geographic concentration designed to address similar issues.) Appendix I
discusses how confidence intervals can be constructed around the estimated segregation index.14
Suppose that there are J firms (or plants) in the sample indexed by j = 1, ....J. Let Zj
be the set of workers in firm ~ and zj the number of workers in this firm. Given a measure of
skill, q, such as wages, education, or worker classification, denote the mean skill-level in the
sample by q (i.e., g = ~ ~ qi /N, where N is the total number of workers in the sample).
j4 iEZ,
Define p as our index of correlation or segregation:
(17)
where workers are indexed by i and k (so that qi is the skill-level of worker i). A correlation
of zero indicates that all firms have the same skill-mix of workers, and a correlation of one
indicates complete segregation, in which all workers within a firm have the same q. Note15
that this index is invariant to affine transformations of the units in which skill is measured.z
The index of correlation, p, is equivalent to one minus the variance of q within firms
divided by the overall variance of q, and thus to the R2 obtained by regressing q on a series
of firm dummies. To see this, add and subtract the mean q ~ within each firm j to obtain:
(18) Zj 1,
21nthe case of a dummy variable, the correlation specializes to the index used by Bell
[1954] and Robinson [1950],
where D denotes the dummy variable. Note that this index normalizes the variance across
plants of the proportion of workers for whom the dummy variable equals one by dividing by
the variance of the dummy variable in the total population. Without normalization,
segregation by production-worker status, for example, would appear higher in an economy
with five firms consisting only of non-production workers and ninety-five consisting only of
production workers than in an economy with one firm consisting of only non-production
workers and ninety-nine firms consisting of production workers. After normalizing, however,
we find that both economies have the maximum segregation index of one.16





where SW’and s~zrepresent the variance of g within and between firms, respective y, and ST’
represents the total variance of q in the economy. For example,
(20)
One virtue of this index is that, since p depends only on the variance of q in the
population and on the variance of mean q between firms, it can be calculated using separate
data sources for workers and firms. This is useful if data linking employees and their firms
are unavailable, as in the United States.
Note that if firms are of finite size, there will be some correlation between the skill-
Ievels of workers in the same firm, even if workers are assigned to firms randomly. That is,
some firms will happen to receive workers of above-average skill, and others will receive
workers of below-average skill. If all firms consisted of K workers, then, with random
assignment, the variance of mean skill between firms would be 1/K times the over-all17
variance of skill between workers, and the expected correlation would thus be l/K.
To compare the extent of segregation across economies with different average firm
sizes, or to determine whether an economy exhibits more segregation than would be expected
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with other workers of exactly the same
that a proportion y of the
skill, and that a proportion
Let o~2 denote the variance of the underlying





randomly will converge to o~2/K as N+=, where K is the number of workers per firm. Since
the variance of wages within firms plus the variance of mean wages between firms must
equal the total variance of wages, the variance of wages within the set of firms with randomly
drawn workers converges to (1- l/~o~2. Since the variance of wages within the firms
consisting of perfectly-matched workers is zero, SW2 for the set of all firms converges to
(l-y)(l -l/m(sT2. Note that in a sample of N workers, the expectation ofs; is (N-1)o~2/N.
Substituting these expressions for SW2 and s~2into (21) and using the fact that K = N/J, we see
that pCconverges to y, which, as desired, is the proportion of the population that matches
with others of the same skill. Simulations suggest that the expectation of pCis y even when
N is small, and even when firms vary in size.18
Two properties of pCare worth noting. First, holding N and J constant, increases in p
correspond to increases in pC. In Section III, we demonstrate how changes in the distribution
of skill affect p. Given that we hold the number of workers per firm constant, changes in pC
will always be of the same sign as changes in p. Second, the adjusted R-squared may be
negative if the correlation between the skills of workers in the same firm is less than that
expected from random assignment of workers to firms.
11.B. Trends in Segregation
Wages, experience, and worker classification are all mperfect indicators of skill, but
together they paint a consistent picture of increasing segregation. Positive correlation of
wages among workers in the same firm may be due to segregation by skill or to
compensating differentials, efficiency wages, or pressures for equity within the firm.
However, there is little reason to think these latter factors increased in importance over the
period, especially given the decline of unions in the United States and Britain. Worker
classification (for example, into production and non-production worker categories) is also
somewhat problematic as a measure of skill, since it reflects characteristics of the job, as well
as of the worker. Nonetheless, non-production worker status is correlated with wages, and
thus is presumably correlated with skill. Berman, Bound, and Machin [1994] show that in the
United States, non-production workers are more highly educated than production workers and
much more likely to be managers or professionals.
Where possible, we measure indicators of skill at plant level rather than firm level.
Plant data are likely to be more economically meaningful than firm data, since it is not clear19
that anything of economic importance changes if a holding company acquires both Microsoft
and McDonalds. However, even the plant data may be misleading since they include only
workers employed by the firm owning the plant and therefore indicate increased segregation
when firms contract out work.3 The American and British data are at the plant level, whereas
the French data are at the level of the business unit, which is conceptually closer to the
American firm than to the plant.
The best available data come from France. The Wage Structure Surveys (ESS),
performed by INSEE in 1986 and 1992, examined a sample of 10,719 business units and
318,332 workers in 1986, and 3,803 business units and 42,783 workers in 1992.4 The sample
was drawn from all business units with at least ten employees, excluding agriculture,
transportation, telecommunications, and services to individuals. Table I, drawn from
Kramarz, Lollivier, and Pele [1996], shows that between 1986 and 1992, the correlation of
log wages among workers in the same business unit rose from 0.36 to 0.44, the correlation of
experience rose from 0,11 to 0.16 and the correlation of seniority rose from 0.24 to 0.31.
Segregation according to each of the six categories of worker classification rose as well. For
example, unskilled blue-collar workers were more likely to be grouped together in firms, as
were engineers, professionals, and managers. Worker classification is likely to be a good
3 In the U.S., increases in the importance of pensions, combined with pension laws
requiring all workers to be treated equally, may have provided a small impetus toward such
contracting out over the period studied, but any increase in correlation from this source is
likely to have been more than counter-balanced by declines in wage correlation within plants
due to the weakening of unions.
4 The ratio of workers to business units is smaller in 1992 because fewer workers were
sampled per firm.20
measure of skill in France, because it is governed by fairly precise rules. We should also
mention that Kramarz, Lollivier, and Pele found that besides increasing segregation, the
period from 1986 to 1992 was also a period of rising inequality,
Table I: Segregation Indexes for Various Indicators of Skill in France
(95% confidence interval in brackets.)
I 1986 I 1992
Log Wages 0.36 0.44
[0.3554; 0,3663] [0.4316; 0.451 8]
Experience (Age) 0.11 0.16
[0.1081; 0.1127] [0.1554; 0.1665]
Seniority 0.24 0.31
[0.2364; 0.2450] [0.3027; 0.3203]
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker dummy 0.31 0.34
[0.3058; 0.3159] [0.3324; 0.3508]
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker dummy 0.23 0.26
[0.2265; 0.2349] [0.2535; 0.2693]
Foreman dummy 0.08 0.10
[0,0785; 0.0820] [0.0970; 0.1044]
Clerk dummy 0.08 0.15
[0.0785; 0.0820] [0.1457; 0.1568]
Technician dummy 0.14 0.17
[0.1376; 0.1433] [0.1652; 0.1768]
Engineer, Professional, or Manager dummy 0.14 0.21
[0.1376; 0.1433] [0.2044; 0.2180]
lource: Kramarz, Lollivier, and Pele [1996]
In the United States, data linking workers and their plants are hard to come by,
However, segregation of workers by wage can be calculated using the Davis and Haltiwanger
[1991] estimates of the variance of wages among all workers from the CPS and of the
variance of average wages between plants from the Census of Manufactures. Unfortunate y,
taking the ratio of estimates from two different data sources makes the measure of segregation21
noisier. Moreover, data are available only for manufacturing workers and reliable data only
for production workers within manufacturing. However, since services are a growing share of
the economy, and services such as finance, restaurants, and law are highly segregated by skill,
their exclusion is likely to lead to underestimation of any increase in sorting,
Table II reports between- and within-plant variances of production worker wages in
manufacturing,5 taken from Davis and Haltiwanger [1991]. The final line reports the
correlation between wages of production workers within the same plant.c Both within-plant
and between-plant variances of wages have increased, reflecting the widely documented rise
in inequality in recent years. However, if there had been no realignment of the way relative
skills were grouped within firms, both variances would have increased in the same ratio. In
fact, the between-plant variance increased proportionately more than the within-plant variance.
Thus, although the data are imperfect, and estimates for
correlation between wages of production workers within
to 1986, as shown in the final row.’
1984 seem particularly suspect, the
the same firm increased from 1975
51tis not possible to obtain reliable data on non-production workers because of
differences in the sampling frames between the two surveys used by Davis and Haltiwanger.
However, the available data show no trend in segregation among non-production workers.
The segregation index was .447 in 1975 and .443 in 1986.
c Note that these correlations are higher than those reported in France, because these data
include only production workers, whereas the French data include all workers. The variance
of production workers’ wages within plants is much smaller than that of all workers.
‘Given the large sample sizes, sampling error is likely to be small, and noise in these
estimates is probably due to other factors, such as business-cycle effects,22
Table II: Sorting of Manufacturing Production Workers by Wages: U.S. Plants
1975 1977 1979 1982 1984 1986
s; 9.00 9.77 10.78 11.81 11.96 13.84
s; 2.13 2.37 2.19 1.82 1.00 2.76
s: 6.86 7.40 8.58 9.99 11.0 11.19
P 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.85 0.92 0.80
]urce: Davis and Haltiwanger [1991], p calculated as sbZ/s~l.
Sorting by production worker/non-production worker status also increased. Table III
shows that the correlation of a dummy variable for non-production worker status among
American manufacturing workers in the same plant increased from 0.195 to 0.228 between
1976 and 1987.s
Table III: Sorting by Production Worker/Non-Production Worker Status: U.S. Plants
Year 1976 1977 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
NPW/Emp 0.261 0.260 0.282 0.287 0.302 0.291 0.304 0.314 0.310
P 0.195 0.192 0.196 0.199 0.215 0.218 0.225 0.231 0.228
Source: Census of Manufactures
British evidence also shows increased segregation by worker classification.9 The 1984
and 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) divide employment in each of 402
British establishments into manual and non-manual components. Manual employment is then
further subdivided into unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled; and non-manual employment is
‘We thank Andrew Bernard, Brad Jensen, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census for
supplying the information in Tables 11and III. Data for 1976 and 1977 may not be strictly
comparable with that from other years, since a different sampling methodology was used by
the census in those years.
we thank Stephen Machin for providing the information in Table IV.23
subdivided into (i) clerical, secretarial, and administrative staffi (ii) supervisors and foremen;
(iii) junior technical/professional; (iv) senior technical/professional, and (v) middle/senior
management. Table IV shows that sorting increased in most worker classifications. For
example, the correlation of a dummy variable for middle/senior managers between workers in
the same firm increased from 0,058 in 1984 to 0.077 in 1990. Sorting of senior
professional/technical staff also increased, contributing to an increase in sorting among all
upper-grade, non-manual workers. There was a rise in segregation among clerical workers,
and among all non-manual workers taken as a whole. Within the category of manual
workers, sorting declined among skilled and semi-skilled manual workers, but increased
among unskilled manual workers. Note that the British evidence, unlike that from the United
States and France, indicates that segregation increased among a fixed sample of plants rather
than just in the economy as a whole.
Section 111explores how segregation and wages are jointly determined given the
technology and the distribution of skill.24



















0.074 0.080 0.058 Managers
Senior. ProflTech 0.072 0.083 0.230
JuniorProf/Tech 0.095 0.090 0.294.
0.241 0.253 Ttl.UpperGr. Non-Manual 0,299
Clerical 0.233 0.222 0.273
TotalNon-Manual 0,511 0.525 0.446
SkilledManual 0.162 0.163 0.341
Semi-skilledManual 0.143 0.132 0.391
UnskilledManual 0,185 0.180 0.415
II TotalManual 1 0.489 0.475 0.44625
III. Theory
Let us extend the analysis of Section I -- which was conducted for two- and three-
point skill-distributions -- to more general distributions. We maintain the hypotheses of
competitive markets and production function (6).
We consider a pair of distributions of types on the integers between ~ and ~ , —
parametrized by 6 l (O,1). For given e, let p(n;9) be the number of workers of skill-level n.
The values 13= O and e = 1 correspond to the “pre-shift” and “post-shift” distributions,
respectively. Let p(e) be the mean of p(. ;e). That is, p(e) = ~np(n;O) / ~P(n;e) . We
n= n=
assume that p(e) also equals n“(e), the mode of the distribution.
Recall from Section I that, if the ratio of two workers’ skill-levels was greater than A
= 2/(1+51’2), then it was more efficient for each of them to match with another of his or her
own skill-level (self-matching), rather than match with one another (cross-matching). Let n,
be the smallest integer no less than An*(l); let nz be the smallest integer no less than
(3/2) 1’2n*(l);and let n] be the smallest integer no less than @n l (1) . We assume that, for





n *(B)-1 nl (0)/A
p(n’(e); e) > ~ p(?z’;e) + ~ P(~’;e),
n’=An *(0) nr=n “(0)+1
An l (O)
~ p(~’;e) < p(~;e), for all n E[nl,n ”(e)] ,
~f=An
(24) p(n; e) > ~ p(n’;6), foralln E[n*(0),n3].
n’ =@n *(6)
As will become clear below, condition (22), which is imposed mainly to simplify the
computations,10 ensures that at least some workers of modal skill will have to self-match, i.e.,
match with others of the same skill in competitive equilibrium. Given the zero-profit
condition, this will serve to tie down their wage (which is why (22) is so convenient to
impose). Conditions (23) and (24) imply that in equilibrium, some workers of every skill
level between nl and n“(e) and between n+(e) and nj will also match with modal workers,
Both the mean level and the dispersion of skill have increased in recent decades.
We consider a shift in the distribution of skill in which, as 6 increases from O to 1, (i) the
‘°Condition (22) can be relaxed considerably. However, the argument becomes
correspondingly more complicated.27
mean rises, i.e.,
(25) n*(1) = n“(o)+l;
and (ii) the lower and upper tails get fatter symmetrical y but retain their “relative shapes, ”
i.e., there exists q > 1 such thatll
(26) P (n; 1) = a, foralln<nlandn>nz.
p (n;O)
lH.A. Wages
We first show that if the distributions p(. ; . ) are “tight” enough -- i.e., if ~ is
sufficiently close to ~ -- then an increase in 9 promotes equality in the sense that wages in —
the lower tail of the distribution rise and wages in the upper tail of the distribution fall,
Proposition 1 (The Trickle-Down Principle): Suppose that p(. ;.) satisfies (22)-(25), Given
llWe adopt (26) not because it is necessarily realistic, but because it facilitates the
presentation of our results. In particular, we wish to argue that, if the skill-distribution is
sufficiently dispersed, then a typical worker in the lower end of the distribution will see his
wage fall and one in the upper end of the distribution will experience a wage increase when
the mean skill-level rises. We demonstrate this (Proposition 2) by showing that the average
wages in the lower and upper tails, respective y, fall and increase. But a change in the
average wage would not be a good measure of what happens to a given worker if the relative
distribution of skills also changed. Hence, (26) makes comparisons easier, although our
qualitative results do not depend on it.28
~,if fi is near enough ~ so that — ~ > (2/3)1/2 n , then
(27) w(n; O) < w(n; l), for all fz<n*(0),
and
(28) w(n; O) > w(n; l), for all n > n“(l).
We establish Proposition 1 through a series of Lemmas.
Lemma 1: For any n’, if n is such that
(29) n< An’,
then workers of skills n and n’ cannot be matched in equilibrium.
Proof As demonstrated in Section I, total output for two workers of skill n and two workers
of skill n’ when they are cross-matched (i.e., 2nn’2 ) is be less than that when they are self-
matched (i.e., n3+n’3) if n/n’cA, Q.E.D,
Lemma z: w(n “(6);0) = (n “((3))3/2.
Proof From (22), even if all workers of all skills n’#n*(e) between An*(9) and n*(e)/A were
matched with workers of skill n*((3),there would still be some n*(f3)-workers left over.29
Moreover, from Lemma 1, no skill outside the interval [An”(e), n*(9)/A] can be matched with
n*(6) in equilibrium. Therefore, at least some n*(6)-workers must be self-matched in
equilibrium. But this means that they earn 1/2 the output of a firm with two workers of skill
n“(e). Q.E.D.
Lemma a: If n < n*(6) and n’ > n“(e), then workers of type n and n‘ cannot be matched in
equilibrium,
Proof]z Total output with one (n,n’) firm and one (n”,n”) firm is Y = n’2n + n*3, where —.
n*=n*((3). Total output with the assignments (n,n”) and (n”,n’) is Y* = n **n + n’2n*. To
prove the lemma, we need to show that Y’ > Y. Note that
(30) Y“-Y= n“=n l n’=n ’ - n’=n - n“3.
Defining z = nln”, and z’ = n’in”, we obtain
(31) ~= Y*-Y=z+z,2
l 3
- ~’=~ - 1 = (Z’=-1)(1-z).
n
Since n’ > n*, Z’ >1, and since n < n*, z <1. Thus the result follows. Q.E.D.
Lemma ~: If n, n’ G (An*(6), n“(e)), then n and n’ cannot be matched in equilibrium.
Proof Assume without loss of generality that n’ 2 n. As in the proof of Lemma 3, we
12Wethank Charles Morcom for the proofs of Lemmas 3, 4, and 6, which are simpler
than the ones we originally developed.30
show that total production by the firms (n,n’) and (n”,n”) (i.e., Y) is less than that by the
firms (n ,n”) and (n’,n”)(i.e., Y ‘). Here, Y = n’2n + n*3 , and Y’ = n*2n+ n’zn’. This
implies that
(32) Y’-Y = n“zn + n“zn’ - n’zn - n*3.
Dividing the right-hand side of (32) by n*3,we obtain
(33) z+ z’- ~’ 2Z - 1 = 2(1 -2’2) + 2’-1 = (1 -2’)(2(1 +2’)- 1).
Now, l-z’ is positive, since n’<n”. As for z(1 +Z ‘)-l, it is increasing in both z and z‘, so we
need only check that it is non-negative at the bottom of the range: z = z’ = A. But at this
point it vanishes. Q.E.D.
Lemma i: If n G (An”(e), n*(f3)), then some n-workers are matched with n*((3)in equilibrium
and so w(n;6) = n(n”(e))z - (n*(e))3/2,
Proof: If n l (An”(e), n“(6)), then from (23) and Lemma 1, the n-workers cannot be matched
exclusively with skills no greater than An”(e). But from Lemma 3, they cannot be matched
with skills greater than n“(e) and, from Lemma 4, they cannot be matched with skills greater
than An”(e) and less than n*(0). Thus by process of elimination, some n-workers must be
matched with n*(e)-workers in equilibrium. From Lemma 2, we conclude that w(n;e) =
n(n*(6))2 - (n*((3))3/2. Q.E.D.31
Lemma b: If ~, ~’= (n*(0), @n l (g)), then n and n’ cannot be matched in equilibrium.
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that n’ 2 n. Let Y’ denote total production with the
assignments (n”,n) and (n*,n’), where n“=n”(e). Then Y’ = nzn” + n’zn”. Let Y denote
production with the assignments (n,n’) and (n”,n”). Then Y = n’2n+n*3. Dividing Y’ - Y by
n*3 we obtain
(34) z=+ z’=- Z’= z-l = Z’2 (1-z)+ Z=-1 = (Z-l) (z+l-z’=).
Now, z-l is positive. As for z+l - z ‘2,it is increasing in z and decreasing in z’. Hence it
attains a minimum when z = 1 and z‘= ~, at which point it vanishes. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1: If n l (n* (e), fin l (e)), some n-workers are matched with n“(e) in equilibrium
and so
(35) W(n; e) = n“(e)?z=-
(n “(0))3
2“
Proof If n l (n”(e), fin *(e)), then from (24) and Lemma 1, the n-workers cannot be
matched exclusively with skills greater than @n l (e). From Lemma 3, they cannot be
matched with skills less than n“(e). And, from Lemma 6, they cannot be matched with skills32
greater than n“(e) and less than or equal to @n l (g). Thus some n-workers must be
matched with n*(9)-workers in equilibrium. From Lemma 2, we deduce (35).
Q.E.D.
We can now establish Proposition 1. Given a sufficiently tight distribution of skills,
all workers will have skill greater than An*(0). Lemma 5 implies, therefore, that, for each
skill level below the mean, at least some workers will have managers of mean skill in
equilibrium. Hence, an increase in the mean skill implies that low-skill workers will have
better managers and therefore that their firms will produce more output. Because the wage
that their managers can obtain from self-matching increases by less than this increase in
output, the assistants will receive part of the increased value of their matches. That is, the
wages of the low-skilled will rise. A tight distribution also means that no worker has skill
greater than fin “(e). Lemma 7 implies, therefore, that for each skill level above the
mean, at least some workers will have assistants of mean skill in equilibrium. An increase in
mean skill produces an increase in output for such matches. However, the wage from self-
matching for those of mean skill will increase by more than output, and hence wages for
high-skill workers will fall in response to this shift in mean skill. More formally, we have:
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose ~ is near enough ~ so that E 2 (2/3) 1’2fi. Because33
(2/3)ln >314> A, we have u 2 (2/3) 1’2fi> 3n”(0)/4 > An”(e). Hence, if n e n*(0),
Lemma 5 implies that w(n;e) = n(n*(e))2 - (n*(9))3/2. Thus dw(n;8)/dn*(6) = n*(e)(2n -
3n*(9)/2). Since n > 3n*(9)/4, this derivative is positive, and so w(n;e) is increasing in e.
Because ?2l (e) > U and (3/2)112< @,
(36)
And so, if n > n*(8), Lemma 7 implies that w(n;e) = n*(e)n2 - (n*(e))3/2. Hence
(37) dw(n;6) /dn ‘(0) = n2 - ~ (n “(6))2 .
From (36), this derivative is negative, and so w(n;f3) is decreasing in e.
Q.E.D.
We now turn to the case in which the distributions p(. ;.) are more diffuse. In that
case, an increase e works against equality. To see this, let nl(e) be the smallest integer
greater than An”(O) (recall that nl =nl(l)), and let S[ consist of all workers with skills no
greater than nl(l). Lemma 8 below will show that any worker in S1, except possibly for an
nl(0)- or nl(l)-worker, is matched in equilibrium with another worker in S1. Moreover, from
Lemmas 3, 4, and 8, any nl(0)- or nl(l )- worker not matched with another worker in S1 is
matched with an n*(9)-worker. Hence, the average wage of workers in SI equals the sum of34
(i) the total output of matches between workers in S, and (ii) the wages of n,(0)- and n,(l)-
workers matched with n“(e)-workers, all divided by the number of workers in S1. But
W(nl(l );(3) falls as (3increases because the wage of an n“(e)-worker from self-matching
increases faster than the output from an nl( 1)-n”(e) match. Moreover, Lemma 1 implies that
in equilibrium there are no matches between nl(0)- and n“(1)-workers, and so, for the purpose
of calculating (ii), we can assume that w(n1(0);(3) also falls as e increases. Furthermore, from
(26), the relative distribution of skills in S1 does not change as (3increases. Hence, the
decrease in (ii) cannot be made up for by an increase in (i). We conclude that the average
wage of workers in S1 must fall.
Next consider the set Sz consisting of workers of skill no less than nz (the smallest
integer no less than (3/2) 1’2n*( 1)). The average wage of workers in Sz equals the sum of (i)
the total output from matches between workers in Sz, and (ii) the wages of workers in Sz
matched with workers with skills in the interval [n”(e),nz-1], all divided by the number of
workers in Sz. Now, nz is big enough so that, for n 2 nz, the wage of an n“(e)-worker from
self-matching increases more slowly than the output from an n*(0)-n match. Hence, the wage
of an n-worker matched with an n“(e)-worker increases with e. Moreover, the argument of
Proposition 1 implies that, for n’= (n*(9),n1), w(n’;(3) falls with e. Hence, the wage of an n-
worker (n > n2) matched with an n’-worker must rise. We conclude that (ii) must rise with (3
and, so from (26), the average wage in Sz also rises.
Formally, we can state:
Proposition z: Suppose that the distributions p(. ;.) satisfy (22)-(26) and are sufficiently35
diffuse so that ~ < ~1 and ~2 < ~. Then the average wage in the tail below n, falls as 8 —
increases from Oto 1. More precisely, we have
Similarly, the average wage inthetail above nz increases with (3:







The formal proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix 2.
Lemmas: Letnl(e) be the smallest integer no less than An*(6) (sothatn1(l)=n1). Ifn<
An”(e) and an n-worker is matched with a worker of skill n’ 2 An”(e) in equilibrium, then
n’ = n,(e).
The proof, which is in Appendix II, calculates the profit for a firm hiring an assistant
of skill n < An”(e). Itshows that profit will be higher with a manager of skill nl(f3) than with
one of greater skill.36
Segregation
We now turn to the issue of segregation. We will show that an increase in skill
dispersion accompanied by a rise in the mean skill-level leads to an increase in the index of
segregation, provided that the shift in the mean is not too large relative to that of dispersion.
To make this last proviso formal, we will no longer work with distributions on the
integers alone. Instead fix (rational) numbers b and ~ with o < b < ~. For each integer — —
r= 1, 2, .... choose integers n’ and fi r, such that b = ~‘/r and ~ = ~ ‘. For each r, we — -—
consider a pair of distributions (p,(.;O), pr(.; l)), where for all integers n l [u’, ~ q, p, (n; e)
is the number of workers of skill n/r. From (25), notice that, if r is big, the shift in the mean
is small when 6 increases from O to 1.
Let us suppose that there exist a >1 and ~ c 1 such that, for all r, (p,(.;O), p,(.; l))
satisfies (22)-(26) and
(40) pr(n; 1) < ~pr(n; O), for all n~(nl,nz).
Condition (40) says that the shift from e = O to e = 1 reduces probability more-or-less
uniformly in the middle of the distribution, Henceforth, we will drop the subscript r when
this does not create ambiguity.
For n, n’ and e, let z(n, n’; (3)be the equilibrium number of matches between n- and
n’-workers. Let p(n, n’) = (n + n’)/2. Then, from (19), the index of segregation can be37
expressed as
Pro~osition2: Suppose that, foreachr= 1,2,..., the pair @,(.;0), p,(.; 1))satisfies (23)-(26)
and (40). Then, for r sufficiently big, p(l )>p(0).
To understand Proposition 3, consider a shift in the skill-distribution satisfying (26)
and (40). The effect of such a shift is to move probability weight to the tails. To simplify
matters, let us assume for the moment that this shift does not affect the mean. Now, because
of the complementarily between tasks, a firm will not hire workers that are too different in
skill-level. Thus, if the shift pushes more workers into the tails of the distribution, it will
push more firms’ means p(n,n’) into the tails. This means that the dispersion of firms’ means
.- the numerator and also the first term of the denominator of (41) -- rises with the shift,
(This argument assumes that the overall mean p(9) does not change too much.) In contrast,
the dispersion of skill within a firm, (n-p(n,n’))2 + (n ‘-p(n,n’))2 does not depend very much
on whether the skill-levels are in the tails or the middle of the distribution -- and thus is not
affected very much by the shift -- since it is determined mainly by the trade-off between task-
complementarity (promoting matching of similar skill-levels) and differential sensitivity to38
skill (enhancing matching of different skill-levels). Hence the second term in the
denominator of (41) remains about the same. The over-all effect of the shift, therefore, is an
increase in p. The formal proof can be found in Appendix II.
Several limitations of our model are worth noting. First, we treat all skills as if they
can be reduced to a single dimension. A fuller model would allow for multi-dimensional
skill, as in Roy [1951]. Second, the model assumes that all workers are producing a single
good, so that there is no interaction between workers through the product market. To the
extent that high- and low-skill workers specialize in production of different goods, increases
in mean-skill will tend to reduce the price of skill-intensive goods, and thus will be more
likely to increase relative wages of low-skill workers. This would partially offset the effect
described in Proposition 2.
Second, the production function allows no substitutability between quantity and quality
of workers. The number of workers in a firm is taken as fixed, rather than as a choice
variable. However, many of the results of this model would presumably hold as partial
equilibrium results in models that allowed for choice of quantity of workers, as long as
quality and quantity were not perfect substitutes. To the extent that high and low-skill
workers specialize in producing different goods, it becomes more likely that an increase in the
mean-skill level of the economy will increase relative wages of low-skill workers.
There is some gap between the theoretical finding that increased skill-dispersion leads
to increased segregation of workers by W and the empirical finding of increased segregation
of workers by wages. Under the model, the relationship between wages and skill is non-
linear and endogenous to the skill-distribution. For a high dispersion of skill, there will be a39
strong correlation between the wages of workers in the same firm, and, for a low dispersion
of skill, there will be a weak correlation. Thus, on average, the correlation between the
wages of workers in the same firm will increase with skill-dispersion. However, the
correlation need not increase monotonically, because over some ranges, small increases in
dispersion may not change the pattern of matching by skill, but may change the wage
schedule so as to reduce the correlation of wages. Thus there may be special cases in which
segregation by wages could increase without a concomitant rise in segregation by skill. This
contrasts with conventional efficiency unit models in which an increase in correlation of
wages within firms will always correspond to an increase in the correlation of skills within
firms.
IV. Skill Dispersion and Segregation across U.S. States
We next argue that, as proposition 3 implies, U.S. states with greater variance of
education are more segregated by education. Casual empiricism suggests the same is true for
countries.
Kremer and Troske [1995] create segregation indices by state based on several
indicators of skill using the Worker-Establishment Characteristics Database (WECD), The
WECD matches 199,557 manufacturing workers to 16,144 manufacturing establishments
[Troske, 1994]. It was created by linking individual data from the 1990 census with
establishment data from the Longitudinal Research Database, using detailed location and
industry information. It should not be taken as representative of American firms, since the40
match rate varies by industry, portion of the country, and plant size. The segregation indices
are computed as the adjusted R* from regressing worker characteristics on a set of firm
dummies in a state. The sample was restricted to firms for which data on more than two
workers were available, which led to the exclusion of four states.
States with greater variance of education13 tend to be more highly segregated by
education, as shown in Table V. A regression of the correlation index on the variance of
education, with observations heteroscedasticity weighted by the square root of the sample
size, yielded a t-statistic of 5.47. Although the model may be a good description of how
workers sort into firms by education, it is not a good description of how they sort by age. A
regression of segregation by age within plants on the variance of age among workers in the
state yielded a t-statistic of -1.69. There was a positive, but not statistically significant,
relationship between segregation and the variance of skill when the skill indicator was either
the log wages or the predicted wage given age, education, sex, marital status, and race.14
13The variance of worker characteristics in each state was calculated using the Sample
Detail File from the l-in-6 census sample, so it is based on a large number of observations
and should be representative of manufacturing workers in the state as a whole.
14Thepredicted wage is calculated from a country-wide regression of log wages on age,
agez, and dummies for female, married, black, female* married, female* black, and various
education levels.41
Table V: Effect of Variance of Skill on Segregation by Skill: U.S. States
Regression of pCfor skill indicator on the variance of the indicator in the state.

























Although comparable data are not available for rigorous comparisons across countries,
the model is consistent with the widespread view that developing countries, with wide skill-
dispersion, are prone to “dualism.” The model suggests that if skill-differentials are
comparatively small, as in highly traditional societies15 or modern societies, workers of high-
and low-skill will mix together within firms. However, in developing economies with a wide
range of skills, such as India or Brazil, low- and high-skill people will work in separate firms,
and relatively low-paid workers in the advanced sector will earn more than relatively high-
paid workers in the traditional sector. In fact, even the less skill-intensive tasks in the formal
sectors of developing countries’ economies are often performed by workers who are highly
skilled and highly paid in comparison to workers in the informal sector, For example, jobs as
clerks in international hotels are highly prized by college graduates in China, and jobs as
flight attendants on Thai Air are sought after by the educated in Thailand.
15 It seems likely that in pre-modern agricultural societies, such as medieval Europe,
Russia under serfdom, or colonial India, many of the better-educated workers helped landlords
manage their estates, and thus worked in the same “firms” with serfs or peasants.42
V. Interpreting Recent Changes in Wages and Segregation
Under our model, the recent simultaneous increases in inequality and segregation
could be due either to skill-biased technological change or a shift in the observable skill-
distribution. Both hypotheses are consistent with the data, although the latter provides a more
parsimonious explanation.
On the technological front, the model predicts that both segregation and inequality
should increase following change in which the effective skill of high-skill workers improves.
There is some evidence that recent technological progress has been of this type. For example,
Kahn and Lim [1994] argue that total factor productivity growth across American industries
has been proportional to the fraction of skilled workers in the industry. Moreover, Berman,
Bound, and Griliches [1994] find evidence that adoption of new technologies may have
placed a premium on high-skill workers. This means that although the old technologies in
which high- and low-skill workers mix are still available, high-skill workers now find it
more attractive to leave the firms and form firms with other high-skill workers. This reduces
the relative wage of low-skill workers because firms hiring them must pay more to attract
complementary high-skill workers,
Our model, however, does not require appeal to largely unobserved skill-biased
technological change to account for changes in wages and segregation; the data can be
explained through observed changes in the distribution of skill in the United States and the
United Kingdom.
There has been a substantial increase in mean-skill in the U.S. over recent decades.43
From 1960-1 to 1987-88, the flow of bachelor’s degrees as a percentage of the labor force
increased 1.58 times. The flow of professional degrees increased 1.65 times, masters’ degrees
2,14 times, and doctorates 1.87 times. [U.S. Department of Education, 1990, Table 220, cited
in Ehrenberg, 1992; Bureau of the Census, 1992]. Most of the increase in the flow took place
during the earlier part of the period, but the stock increased throughout the period, as less
educated people left the labor force.
Evidence that the increase in the average skill in the United States has been
accompanied by a moderate rise in dispersion of skill is provided by .Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce [1993]. They partition increased wage inequality from 1964 to 1988 into increases in
the dispersion of observable indicators of skill (education and experience), increases in returns
to those observable skills, and increases in inequality due to unobservable factors. 16
Somewhat more than 20% of the growth in inequality due to observable factors can be
attributed directly to increased dispersion of skill, holding the wage schedule constant .17
We do not have data on the skill-distribution in France, but British data also indicate
an increased mean and dispersion of skill. Schmitt [1992] reports the distribution of the
lbThey measure wage inequality by the gap between log wages of workers at the 10th and
90th percentiles of the wage distribution.
17The single biggest source of increased inequality is the increase in dispersion of wages
within education-experience groups, This could be due to increased variance in skills that are
unobservable to the econometrician or to increased returns to these unobservable skills. If
one assumes that the decomposition into quantity and price changes is the same for
unobserved as for observed variables, then slightly more than 20 percent of the total increase
in inequality is accounted for by the direct impact of widening of the skill-distribution.
Under the assumption that the entire change in the residual is due to changes in prices, rather
than quantities, of unobserved skill, widening of the skill-distribution explains just under 10
percent of the increased inequality.44
British workforce by educational qualifications in 1978-80 and 1986-88, based on data from
the General Household Survey. In 1974-76 the median worker had no qualifications beyond
primary education. By 1986-88, the median worker had some O-levels or lower-middle
vocational education. We calculated the variance of expected log wages conditional on
education in both periods, holding constant the wage schedule, as a measure of the variance
of the observable skill distribution. lE The variance of skill, as measured by the variance of
expected log wages conditional on education, increased 20% from 0.0410 in 1978-80 to
0,0488 in 1986-88.
Thus, at least in the U.S and Britain, there have been significant changes in the mean
and dispersion of the skill-distribution. These changes have not been as profound as the shift
in the wage-distribution, but such a discrepancy is to be expected from our theory (see
proposition 2 and 3). Of course, to assess the predictions of our model quantitatively would
require a more detailed and richer formulation of the production function than that of section
III.
One issue that arises in interpreting the empirical results is the timing of the
relationship between changes in the skill-distribution and changes in worker-matching. If
there are search costs, changes in the skill-distribution may primarily affect matching of new
entrants to the labor force and of the unemployed, rather than causing workers who were
already matched to switch jobs. Matching patterns among workers may thus respond to
changes in the skill-distribution only with a lag. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce [1993] find the
1sThe wage schedule is based on Schmitt’s estimates of differences in wages by education
group for male workers with twenty years of experience in 1986-88.45
greatest increase in dispersion of skill in the U.S. occurred from 1964 to 1979, There was a
smaller increase in skill dispersion from 1979 to 1988, with about ten percent of the total
increase in the wage differential between workers at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the wage
distribution accounted for by increasing dispersion of observable skills. Overall, only three
percent of the increase in wage dispersion between 1979 and 1988 can be attributed directly
to measured increases in skill dispersion. The data on segregation of workers by skill cover
the period 1975-86, with the increase in segregation coming between 1977 and 1984. It is
possible that changes in sorting during the later period reflect either the small
contemporaneous widening of the skill-distribution, or the larger earlier widening of this
distribution.
In sum, the data are consistent either with the hypothesis that technological change
raised the effective skill of high-skill workers, or with the more parsimonious story that there
were simply observed increases the mean and dispersion of skill. In either case, the model
can explain the simultaneous rise in segregation and inequality.
Our model is also consistent with the absolute decline in wages for low-skill workers
found by Katz and Murphy [1992]. The simplest models of skill-biased technological change
do not generate such a decline. Technological change that opens up new opportunities for
high-skill workers does not necessarily make low-skill workers worse off, since the older
technologies remain available, Technological change that increases the productivity of low-
skill workers could reduce their wages by reducing the prices of products they produce.
There is, however, mixed evidence about whether there has been a fall in prices of goods
produced by low-skill workers and, if so, sufficient to explain the reduction in wages for low-46
skill workers [Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Krugman and Lawrence, 1993; Sachs and
Shatz, 1994; Krueger, 1996].
VI. Policy Implications and Directions for Future Research
To conclude, let us consider two prominent social policy issues that have rather
different implications in our model than in more standard frameworks, and speculate on the
dynamic interaction between inequality and segregation.
In many countries, there are strong social norms promoting equality across workers
within a firm. Freeman [1980], for example, provides evidence that unions typically reduce
intra-firm wage differentials, Our model implies that social norms for equality within the
firm may have perverse effects on the distribution of income in the economy as a whole, 19 If
low- and high-skill workers were perfect substitutes, pressures for equality within the firm
would lead to increased segregation by skill, but would not affect wages or output, However,
in our model, pressures for equality within the firm will reduce output. Moreover, they may
perversely reduce wages for low-skill workers by causing high-skill workers to sort into
separate firms, thus depriving low-skill workers of the benefit of cross-matching.20
‘we are grateful to Daron Acemoglu for suggestions on this point.
20Forexample, suppose that some workers had skill 1, and that slightly more workers had
skill 1.5, so that rents from cooperation would accrue to the scarce low-skill workers. Some
firms would match together the two types of worker, and produce output 2.25. Firms with
only high-skill workers would produce output 3.375, so high-skill workers would earn half of
this, or 1.6875. Low-skill workers would earn 2.25 - 1.6875, or .5625. If pressures for
intra-firm equity made it impossible to have a wage gap this great, then .11 high-skill workers
would self-match together, and earn a wage of 1.6875 -- exactly what they earned otherwise.47
The model also bears on tax policies, such as those in the Clinton health care
proposal, that encourage increased segregation of high-wage workers [Cutler, 1994;
Elmendorf and Hamilton, 1994; Sheiner, 1994]. Under standard efficiency unit models,
workplace composition would be perfectly elastic to such incentives, and so revenue
calculations based on the current workplace composition would seriously overestimate
revenue. However, such policies would have no harmful effect on efficiency. Under our
model, by contrast, workforce composition would be only imperfectly elastic to incentives for
segregation (and so naive revenue estimates might not perform badly). Still, changes in
workforce composition would create deadweight losses,
We have taken the distribution of skill as exogenous. Future researchers may wish to
endogenize the distribution of skill, and in particular to examine the effect of matching
patterns on skill acquisition. In industries in which people learn from high-skill colleagues, a
worker often serves as assistant to a high-skill manager when young, and as the manager of
low-skill assistants when old.21 For example, young lawyers and doctors start out assisting
more senior colleagues, performing tasks that are only moderately sensitive to skill. In the
process, they profit from the wisdom of their elders. Later, when human capital accumulation
is less important, most take positions of higher rank and supervise less-skilled subordinates.
It is relatively cheap to provide training in this way if there are tasks that are suited to
Low-skill workers would also self-match and earn a wage of .5-- less than what they would
have earned in the absence of pressures for equity within the firm.
21This is not to deny that there are also learning environments in which people maximize
learning by performing a high-skill job, even if their co-workers are of lower skill.48
workers of medium skill, as in law or medicine.22
These examples suggest that increases in segregation will spur future inequality of
skill by reducing opportunities for low-skill workers to learn from high-skill co-workers.
This raises the possibility that exogenous increases in either segregation or skill inequality
may spur a vicious cycle of ever-rising inequality and segregation,
Besides its implications for income distribution and the evolution of the skill
distribution, the pattern of matching may have political and social implications. A society in
which high- and low-skill workers match together in firms is likely to have a more
homogeneous culture than one in which people match with others of their own skill.
Language, customs, and fashions are likely to be more similar if there is more interaction
between groups. Societies with wide distributions of skill, such as the contemporary United
States, Brwil, and India, are more likely to develop separate subcultures and perhaps to
experience political and social conflict between these subcultures. On the other hand, a
pattern of matching in which groups of people always play the same role (manager or
assistant) may develop into a caste-like system, in which participants work together, but in a
rigid hierarchy. There may be advantages to matching patterns in which over wide ranges
people are indifferent between being the assistant to a higher level manager or the manager of
a lower level assistant, so that they play different roles in different situations.
22Of course, this condition does not always obtain. For example, young baseball players
would presumably learn a great deal from playing in the major leagues, but the production
function makes it important to match the best players together, and so young players train in
the minor leagues, probably less effectively.49
Appendix I
It is possible to construct a confidence interval for the segregation index under the
assumption that the sampling errors in the estimates of the variances of q within and between
firms are independent. This will be the case if the variance of q within the firm is
independent of the average q within a firm or is a linear function of the average q within the
firm.
Given that s2#/02W and s2~J/02~are distributed as independent ~2 variables with N-Y
and J-1 degrees of freedom respectively,
1 1





where b~is an F-distributed random variable with (N-J, J- 1) degrees of freedom.Thus a 95-percent-confidence interval for the index of segregation is
(A.2)
F(N-J, J- 1)0.W5 F(N-J, J- l)o.m~
<p<
2 2
F(N-J, J-1 )o.m5 + : F(N-J, J- 1)OW5+ :
s~ s~
where F(N-J, J-I) 0.975J and F(N-JJ ‘-1)0.025 are ‘Umbers at ‘hich ‘he cumulative Probability
distribution function F(N-JJ-1) takes the values 0,975 and 0.025 respectively.
This derivation assumed that the variance of q within a firm was independent of, or
linear in, the firm’s average q. If the variance of q within firms is convex in the average q in
a firm, then when a sample of firms is picked that has a high variance of average q, it will
also tend to have a high variance of q within firms, which will make the estimate more
precise than the calculations below would indicate. The variance of q within firms will be
convex in average q, for example, if the standard deviation of q within the firm is
proportional to the average q within the firm. On the other hand, if the variance of q within
firms is concave in average q, then the formulas above will understate the width of the
confidence interval. Note that this will be the case for dichotomous variables, such as race or
production worker status, because the variance of the characteristic within the firm equals p(l
- p), where p is the share of people with the characteristic. However, when this share is
close to one or zero, the variance within firms will be approximately linear in average q, and
the estimated confidence intervals should not be that far off.51
Appendix II
Proof of Lemma&: Consider n< An*(0). Suppose arm-worker ismatched with some skill
n’ > An”(e). From Lemma 1, an n worker cannot be matched with n’ 2 n*(0). Hence
consider n’ l [n1(6), n*(0)). Given that, from Lemma 5, w(n’;e) = n’(n*(f3))2 - (n*(e))3/2,
we have
(~“(6))3_ ~(n,). (A.3) v(n,n’;e) = n(n’)2 - w(n’ ;6) = n(n’)2 - n’ (n *(0))z + ~
It suffices to show that, on the interval [n,(e), n“(e)], H(n’) is maximized at n’ = nl(e). To
establish this, note that the derivative of H(”) is 2nn’ - (n*(f3))2. Now at n’ = n1((3),2nn’ <
2A2(n*(6))2 < (n*(0))z, and so the derivative is negative at this point. Suppose there exists p >
n1((3)(not necessarily an integer] such that H(p) = H(nl(0)). In fact, let p be the smallest
such number. Then dH(p)/dn’ 20. Moreover, because 2nn’ - (n*(9))2 is increasing in n’,
dH(n’)/dn’ >0, for all n’ > p. Since H(p) = H(n1(f3)),
(A.4) H(n l (O)) > H(n’ ) for all n’ l [nl(t3),n l (O)) ,
But if n is matched with n’ in equilibrium, then Zf(n’) 2 H(n’(e)), a contradiction of (A.4).
We conclude that there
= n,(e) as claimed.
Proof of Proposition z:
is no p such that H@) = H(n1(9)), and so H(n’) is maximized at n’
Q.E.D.
Let S1= {n In < n,). Competitive equilibrium maximizes total52
product, and, for any match, the sum of the equilibrium wages equals the match’s product.
Moreover, for any n < nl(0), Lemma 8 implies that an n-worker is matched with another
worker in S,. Finally from Lemmas 1, 3, and 4, an nl(0)- or nl-worker is matched either with







max ~ ~ z(n, ?z’)n(n’)2 + ~ Z(?z, n”(e)) v(n, n”(e); e)
2(”,“) n’=~ n=~ n=n,(0)
~ Z(n,n’) <p(n;e), ?z=n,...,nl(o)- 1
ns =~
and
(A.7) ; Z(n,n’) + Z(?z,n”(e)) < p(n;e), n = n,(o), n,,
~a=~
where, for all n, n’, z(n,n’) is the number of matches between an n-worker and an n’-
worker, and v(n, n’;0) is the wage for an n-worker if matched with an n’-worker (which
may or may not occur in equilibrium), assuming the latter is paid his equilibrium wage
W(n’;e).53
Let PI’ be the variant of program (A.5)-(A.7) in which 6 = 1 in (A.5) but 6 = O in
(A.6)-(A,7). Denote by RI’ the maximized value of the objective in P,’. Because A < %,
n*(t3)(2n-3n*(9)/2) is negative when n = n,(i) for i=O,l. Hence, v(n1(i),n*(6);9)= nl(i)(n*(f3))2-
l/2(n*(6))3 is decreasing in 0. We conclude that R,’ < RI(0). But from (26), the constraints in
program P,’ are proportional to (A.6)-(A,7) with 6 = 1. Hence,
(A.8)
RI ‘





and so from (A.8) and the fact that RI’ c RI(0) we conclude that (38) holds.
From Lemma 3, a worker in the set consisting of Sz of workers of skill no less than nz
must be matched either with another worker in Sz or with a worker of type n’~ [n*((3),n2-1].
E







S Z(n’,?z) s p(?z;e), ?z=n,, .....i.
n’ =n “(0)
(~“(0))3,fm V(?z,?z”(e); e) = n“(e)nz - n 2 n2m
2
From Lemma 7, (35), and the fact that nz < &n l (o),
v(n, n’; e) = n’n2 – n*((3)(n’)2 +
(n “(0))3
(A.12) 2’
if n’e(n*(6), n2) and n >n2 .
For n 2 nz, the fact that n2 2(3/2 )1’2n*(l)definition of nz implies that the right-hand side of
(A. 11) is increasing in 0. Similarly, because n’ < nz, the right-hand side of (A. 12) is also
increasing in 8. We conclude that if Pz’ is the program in which (3= 1 in (A.9) but (3= O in
(A. 10), the maximized value Rz’ of the corresponding objective satisfies RZ’>RZ(0). But from55








Proof of Pror)osition s: We can decompose (41) as follows. Let Be and WObe the
dispersions of wages between and within firms, respectively, for those firms that hire only
workers from the interval [n,+ 1,nz-1]. Then
(A.14) Be = ~ (v(~s~’) - ~“(e))’z(~!~’;e)
n,n’E[nl+l, q-l]
and
(A.15) W. = ~ (?2- p(n,n’))’z(n,n’;e) .
n,n’c[nl+l, ~-l]
Similarly, let Be’ and W~’be the dispersions, respectively, between and within all other56
firms. We have:
~,’ = ~ ~ (P(~,~’) - ~*(e))2z(~,~’;e) +
(A.16) n’=n n$[n,+lp%-ll
E ~ (P(~,~’) -~”(e))’z(~>~’;e)
n’@[nl+l, q-l] nE[nl+l, q-l]
and




n’ c[nl+l, ~-l] ne[nl+l, q-n
We can rewrite (41) as
(A.18)
Now, the proofs of Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that if n, n’ c (n1,n2),then z(n,n’;e) >0 if and57
only if either n = n“(e) or n’ = n*(6). But then
(A.19) ]p(n,n’) - n“(e)l = In - p(n,n’)1,
and so
(A.20) BO = We.
Moreover, from Lemma 3, if z(n, n’;e) >0 and n s nl, or n 2 nz, then
(A.21) In - p(n,n’) I s] p(n,n’) - n“(e) 1,
with strict inequality unless n’ = n*(9). Hence,
(A.22) We’ < Be’





where A >0. Now, below, we will show that, for r sufficiently big, (40) implies that
(A.24) B1 < ~BO
and (26) implies that
(A.25) B1‘ = aBO’ and WI’ = aWO’.
Now, the fact that A>O and (A.23)-(A.25) imply
(A.26)
~Bo+aBo’
P(l) > ypBo+z~Bo’ -aA58
But because a> 1 >~and A> O,theright-hand side of(A,26) exceeds that of(A.23) with
9=0, establishing that p(l) > p(0). It remains to establish (A.24) and (A.25).
Toderive(A.24), note that,
~,= ~ (l-l(?z,n’)-n”( l))’z(n,n’;l)
n,n’~[nl+l,q-l]
=! ~ (n-n*(l))2z(n,n*(l);l) from Lemmas 3-7
(A.27) 2nE[n,+l*-1]




To demonstrate (A.25), note that, for r sufficiently big, v(n, n*(0);O) = v(n, n*(l); 1)
andsofrom (A.5)to (A.6)and(A.8) to(A.8).
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